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Abstract:
This paper uses a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) estimated 
on U.S. data in order to analyze monetary transmission via private sector balance 
sheets, credit risk spreads and asset markets in an integrated setup and to explore the 
role of monetary policy in the three imbalances that were observed prior to the global 
financial crisis: high house price inflation, strong private debt growth and low credit 
risk spreads. The results suggest that (i) monetary policy shocks have a highly 
significant and persistent effect on house prices, real estate wealth and private sector 
debt as well as a strong short-lived effect on risk spreads in the money and mortgage 
markets; (ii) monetary policy shocks have contributed discernibly, but at a late stage 
to the unsustainable developments in house and credit markets that were observable 
between 2001 and 2006; (iii) financial shocks have influenced the path of policy rates 
prior to the crisis, and the feedback effects of financial shocks via lower policy rates 
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on property and credit markets are found to have probably been considerable. 5
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The impact of monetary policy shocks on financial conditions, i.e. asset prices, 
lending terms and balance sheets, has been one of the most topical issues in monetary 
economics over the last years. The interest in the topic has recently gained further 
impetus from the coincidence of unprecedented property price inflation (“housing 
bubble”), a massive expansion of private sector indebtedness (“credit bubble”) and 
very low risk-spreads in credit markets (“under-pricing of risk”) on the one side, and, 
on the other side, exceptionally low levels of policy rates in the U.S. prior to the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis, i.e. between 2001 and 2006. This coincidence 
has led a number of observers – most prominently John Taylor (2007, 2009) and the 
BIS (2007, 2008) – to argue that an excessively loose monetary policy stance was one 
of the key factors contributing to the imbalances in housing and credit markets prior 
to the crisis.  
 
This paper uses a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) estimated 
on quarterly data over the sample period 1987 to 2007 to explore the interaction 
between monetary policy and more than 200 financial and asset variables in the U.S. 
It contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it provides a unified and 
comprehensive characterization of the transmission of monetary policy shocks via 
financial conditions, covering a broad range of asset prices, interest rates, risk spreads 
and private sector balance sheet components by means of an impulse response 
analysis. Second, the paper assesses the role of monetary policy shocks in the build-
up of the pre-crisis imbalances in housing and credit markets based on historical 
decompositions. Third, the paper also explores based on counterfactual simulations 
the role of the systematic reaction of monetary policy to financial (as well as macro) 
shocks. The analysis is based on an identification scheme which allows for 
contemporaneous interaction between policy rates and financial variables and hence 
allows exploring not only the effects of monetary policy shocks on financial variables, 
but also the role of financial shocks for the path of policy rates over time.  
 
The main findings of our analysis are as follows. (i) Monetary policy shocks have a 
highly significant and persistent effect on property prices, real estate wealth and 
private sector debt as well as a strong short-lived effect on risk spreads in the money 
market, the mortgage market and the C&I loan market. The impulse response analysis 
supports the notion that financial frictions play a role in the transmission of monetary 
policy. (ii) Monetary policy shocks have contributed discernibly, but at a late stage to 
the unsustainable dynamics in housing and credit markets that were observed between 
2001 and 2006. (iii) Negative financial shocks in the wake of the bursting the dot-com 6
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bubble have significantly contributed to the low level of policy rates observed prior to 
the global financial crisis. The feedback effects of these negative financial shocks via 
lower policy rates on property and credit markets are found to have probably been 
considerable.  
 1. Introduction 
 
The impact of monetary policy shocks on financial conditions, i.e. asset prices, 
lending terms and balance sheets, has been one of the most topical issues in monetary 
economics over the last years. The interest in the topic has recently gained further 
impetus from the coincidence of unprecedented property price inflation (“housing 
bubble”), a massive expansion of private sector indebtedness (“credit bubble”) and 
very low risk-spreads in credit markets (“under-pricing of risk”) on the one side, and, 
on the other side, exceptionally low levels of policy rates in the U.S. prior to the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis, i.e. between 2001 and 2006, as shown in Figure 
1. This coincidence has led a number of observers – most prominently Taylor (2007, 
2009) and the BIS (2007, 2008) – to argue that an excessively loose monetary policy 
stance was one of the key factors contributing to the imbalances in housing and credit 
markets prior to the crisis.
1  
 
The scope of this paper is to contribute to the literature on the transmission of 
monetary policy via financial conditions and to explore the role of monetary policy in 
the build-up of imbalances in property and credit markets before the financial crisis. 
To this end, we employ a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR), a 
novel empirical tool proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005). The FAVAR enables us to 
analyze monetary transmission over a large range of financial variables, i.e. property 
and stock prices, interest rates, credit risk spreads and non-financial private sector 
assets and liabilities
2, based on a unified, consistent modelling framework exploiting 
the close correlation between these variables indicated by Figure 1. More specifically, 
the FAVAR developed in this paper extends a standard macroeconomic vector 
autoregressive model (VAR) with a set of (financial) factors summarizing more than 
200 quarterly financial variables. To identify the monetary policy shock, we adopt an 
identification scheme that combines contemporaneous zero restrictions and 
theoretically motivated sign restrictions on short-term impulse response functions (see 
e.g. Peersman 2005 and Uhlig 2005), allowing for contemporaneous interaction 
between the policy rate and financial factors. This identification scheme further 
enables us to disentangle financial shocks and macro shocks. 
 
The two main contributions of the paper are the following. First, we provide a unified 
and comprehensive characterization of the transmission of monetary policy shocks via 
                                                 
1 For comprehensive assessments of the causes of the financial turmoil, see e.g. Borio (2008), Buiter 
(2007), Brunnermeier (2008) and Gorton (2009). 
2 For ease of reference we refer to all these variables as financial variables, being aware that this 
terminology is somewhat sloppy in the case of house prices and real estate and other tangible assets.   
7
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and private sector balance sheet components by means of impulse response analysis. 
This is novel, as the related existing literature has so far focused on specific aspects of 
monetary transmission,
3 while a comprehensive analysis of the transmission of 
monetary policy shocks via financial conditions encompassing all these specific 
aspects has still been missing. The impulse response analysis allows to assess the 
relative strength of monetary transmission via different asset markets, credit markets 
and balance sheets and sheds light on the relevance of financial frictions in the 
transmission process. 
 
Second, we assess the role of monetary policy in the build-up of the pre-crisis 
imbalances in housing and credit markets. A number of recent academic studies have 
explored the contribution of monetary policy shocks, i.e. the deviation of policy rates 
from their estimated usual reaction patterns or some postulated reaction pattern 
(Taylor rule) to the housing boom (Taylor 2007, Iacoviello and Neri 2008, JarociĔski 
and Smets 2008, Del Negro and Otrok 2007), but without coming to consistent 
conclusions. In this paper we assess, based on historical decompositions, the role of 
monetary policy shocks in the housing boom as well as in the two other pre-crisis 
phenomena highlighted in Figure 1, i.e. the excessive debt accumulation in the private 
non-financial sector and the low risk spreads in credit markets, which have so far 
remained unexplored. In this context, we also show that the inconsistencies in the 
results regarding the role of monetary policy shocks in the housing boom produced by 
previous studies can be linked to differences in sample periods.  
 
Besides assessing the role of monetary policy shocks, we also explore based on 
counterfactual simulations the role of systematic monetary policy, i.e. of the estimated 
reaction of the policy rate to financial (as well as macro) shocks. Since we allow for 
contemporaneous interaction between policy rates and financial variables, we can not 
only explore the effects of monetary policy shocks on financial variables, but also the 
role of financial shocks for the path of policy rates over time. Via counterfactual 
simulations we then assess to what extent the reaction of monetary policy to financial 
(and macro) shocks has fed back to housing and credit markets. That way we can 
assess the widely held view that the monetary easing in reaction to the bursting of the 
                                                 
3 These included for example studies on the transmission via flow of funds (Christiano et al. 1996), 
stock prices (e.g. Bjørnland and Leitemo 2009, Bernanke and Kuttner 2005), house prices (e.g. 
Iacoviello and Neri 2008, JarocíĔski and Smets 2008, Del Negro and Otrok 2007, Bjørnland and 
Jacobsen 2008) or lending standards (e.g. Jiménez et al. 2007, Ionnadou et al. 2008, Maddaloni et al. 
2009, Altunbas et al. 2009).  
8
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boom.  
 
The main findings of our analysis are as follows. (i) Monetary policy shocks have a 
highly significant and persistent effect on property prices, real estate wealth and 
private sector debt as well as a strong short-lived effect on risk spreads in the money 
and mortgage markets; (ii) monetary policy shocks have contributed discernibly, but 
at a late stage to the unsustainable dynamics in house and credit markets that were 
observable between 2001 and 2006; (iii) financial shocks have influenced the path of 
policy rates prior to the crisis, and the feedback effects of financial shocks via lower 
policy rates on property and credit markets has probably been considerable. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the data 
and explain in section 3 the methodology. In section 4 we present our keys results for 
the effect of monetary policy shocks on asset prices, interest rates, lending terms and 
balance sheets: we provide and discuss the results of the impulse response analysis, 
the variance and the historical decompositions. In section 5, we assess the respective 
role of monetary policy, macro and financial shocks for the path of policy rates and 
present the results of the counterfactual simulations for the assessment of the role of 
systematic monetary policy in the pre-crisis boom. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The quarterly dataset used in this study is composed of three standard macro 
variables, real GDP growth, GDP deflator inflation and the effective Federal Funds 
rate (retrieved from the St. Louis FRED database), as well as 232 financial variables 
comprising 69 property prices, 62 stock market indices, 50 money, capital and loan 
interest rates and spreads, 2 monetary aggregates and 49 series from private non-
financial sector balance sheets. Stock prices, property prices, monetary aggregates, 
and balance sheet variables were converted to real units by deflation with the GDP 
deflator. In the following we provide a brief description of the main characteristics of 
the different data categories. A complete list of all the financial variables, the data 
sources and how the data series have been transformed for the empirical analysis is 
provided in the data appendix (Table A.1). 
9
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4 is mainly comprised of the set of 
FHFA/OFHEO
5 house price indices for the U.S. national level and the 51 U.S. states. 
The FHFA/OFHEO house price indices are repeat-sales based indices of existing 
single-family homes, measuring average price changes in repeat sales or refinancings 
on the same properties. The indices are based on information obtained by reviewing 
repeat mortgage transactions on single-family properties whose mortgages have been 
purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Besides the FHFA/OFHEO 
house price indices, we have also included a number of other relevant property price 
measures. The national Freddie Mac conventional home loan price indices, which are 
constructed in a way very similar to the FHFA/OFHEO indices; the national and 
regional Census Bureau house price series measuring the mean and the median price 
developments of new single family homes; the National Association of Realtors 
(NAR) house price index measuring the median sales price of existing homes 
gathered from Multiple Listing Services (MLSs); and the S&P/Case-Shiller national 
house price index, constructed based on information on purchase prices obtained from 
county assessors and recorder offices, covering all loans including exotic 
nonconforming and sub-prime.
6 Finally, besides all these residential property price 
measures, we also include the MIT/CRE commercial property price index, a 
transactions-based price index constructed based on data from the National Council of 
Real Estate Investment Fiducaries (NCREIF) by the MIT Center for Real Estate.
7   
 
The stock price block of our dataset is composed of the S&P 500, summarizing the 
share price development of the 500 largest listed U.S. companies weighted by market 
capitalization, and its 59 sectoral sub-indices. Besides the S&P indices, we also 
include the Dow Jones Industrials Average, which summarizes the share price 
development of 30 companies listed on the NYSE, and the NASDAQ composite 
index, which summarizes the share prices of more than 3,000 firms listed on the 
NASDAQ stock market.  
 
                                                 
4 Note that we do not include housing activity indicators such as home sales and housing construction 
in the analysis since these are real activity variables and therefore do conceptually not fit in our factor 
model exclusively comprised of asset prices and financial variables. For a recent analysis of housing 
activity indicators see Ng and Mönch (2009). 
5 OFHEO stands for Office of Federal Housing Oversight, which was an agency within the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. In 2008, OFHEO was combined with the Federal 
Housing Finance Board (FHFB) to form the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).   
6 For a more detailed description and comparison of the construction of the different house price 
indices see e.g. Peek and Wilcox (1991), National Association of Realtors (2008) and Leventine 
(2008). 
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capital market interest rates, including Treasury bills, Treasury bonds, commercial 
paper rates, corporate bond rates as well as rates on certificates of deposit and 
Eurodollar deposits. We further include a large range of retail lending interest rates, 
including  mortgage loan rates, consumer loan rates and commercial and industrial 
(C&I) loan rates. Based on these interest rates we construct various risk spreads by 
taking the difference between the respective interest rate and an appropriate risk-free 
benchmark interest rate.  
 
The two monetary aggregates included in the database are the Federal Reserve 
Board’s two money stock measures M1 and M2. The balance sheet data from the 
Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts (Tables B.100, B.102 and B.103) cover 
the household sector (also including non-profit organizations), the non-financial 
corporate sector and the non-farm non-corporate sector while balance sheets for the 
financial sector are not available. The main difference between the flow of funds 
accounts, which have been used in Christiano et al. (1996), and the balance sheets is 
that the former provide information exclusively on changes in (flows of) financial 
assets and liabilities of the different sectors, while the latter provides information on 
the stock of the various components of the three sectors’ assets and liabilities 
(including real estate assets and mortgage debt) and their net worth, i.e. the difference 
between total assets and total liabilities. Stock market and real estate wealth are 
valued at market prices, other tangible assets (equipment and software, consumer 
nondurable goods and inventories) are valued at replacement costs. All other 
components of assets and liabilities are valued at book value.
8  
 
The data are transformed in the usual manner for factor analysis, i.e. they are 
standardized to have a zero mean and a unit variance. Stationarity of the variables is 
ensured through differencing if necessary: all variables enter in log differences except 
for interest rates and spreads which enter in levels. Finally, outliers are removed.
9  
 
The baseline sample period for the analysis for which the database is compiled is 
1987Q3 to 2007Q4. This period covers essentially the Greenspan chairmanship and 
therefore focuses the analysis on a single monetary policy regime. Further motivations 
for this choice of sample period are structural changes in the banking sector in the 
1970s and early 1980s as well as the change in the monetary policy regime and the 
                                                 
8 For more details on the balance sheet data, see Federal Reserve Board (2009). 
9 Outliers are defined as observations of the stationary data with absolute median deviations larger than 
six times the interquartile range. They are replaced by the median value of the preceding five 
observations. See also Stock and Watson (2005). 
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inflation (“Great Moderation”) in the early/mid 1980s. In section 4.5 we also consider 
a longer sample period starting in 1975Q1 in order to reconcile the already mentioned 
inconsistencies in the results reported by previous studies on the role of monetary 
policy in the recent housing boom, which appear to be related to the choice of sample 
period. The starting period of the longer sample analysis is determined by the 
availability of the FHFA/OFHEO house price indices. Except for the S&P/Case-
Shiller house price index and the MIT/CRE commercial property price index, all the 




We start from a small-scale macroeconomic VAR model which includes GDP growth 
( t y Δ ), GDP deflator inflation ( t p Δ ) and the Federal Funds rate ( t ffr ) as endogenous 
variables which can be summarized in the  (3 )1 M =× -dimensional vector 
[ ] G' =Δ Δ tt t t y p ffr . This set of variables represents the standard block of 
variables included in monetary policy VARs (e.g. Schorfheide and Del Negro 2003, 
Peersman 2005, Christiano et al. 1996). We augment Gt with a set of financial factors 
Ht which yields the  1 r× -dimensional vector of  [ ] FG ' H ' ' ttt =  where  1 rM −×  is 
the dimension of the vector of financial factors.  [ ] 1 H' − =  tt r M t hh  is unobserved 
and needs to be estimated as explained below.  
 
We model the joint dynamics of macro variables and financial factors as a VAR( p ) 
process: 
 
 A( )F c Qw =+ tt L , (1) 
 
where  1 A( ) A ... A
p
p LI L L =− −−  is a lag polynomial of finite order  p ,  c is a 
constant, and wt  is a vector of structural shocks which can be recovered by imposing 
restrictions on Q. 
 
Let the elements of F t  be the common factors driving the  1 × N  vector Xt  which 
summarizes our 232 ( N = ) financial variables. It is assumed that Xt  follows an 
approximate dynamic factor model (e.g. Bai and Ng 2002, Stock and Watson 2002): 
 
  X' F =Λ +Ξ tt t , (2) 
12
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where  [] ' 1 Nt t t ξ ξ  = Ξ  denotes a  1 × N  vector of idiosyncratic components.
10 The 
matrix of factor loadings  [ ] 1 N λ λ Λ=   has dimension rN ×  and  , 1,..., i iN λ =  
are of dimension  1 r× . Typically, rN << . Common and idiosyncratic components 
are orthogonal, the common factors are mutually orthogonal, and idiosyncratic 
components can be weakly mutually and serially correlated in the sense of 
Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983).
11  
 




The model is estimated in five steps. First, the dimension of F t , i.e. the number of 
common (latent and observable) factors r  is determined to be 6, which explain 
roughly two thirds (64 percent) of the dataset. This represents a reasonable degree of 




Second, the latent factors summarized in Ht span the space spanned by F t  after 
removal of the three observable factors. Ht is estimated by means of the iterative 
procedure suggested by Boivin and Giannoni (2008). We start with an initial estimate 
of Ht denoted by 
(0) ˆ Ht  and obtained as the first  3 rM −=  principal components of 
Xt . We then regress Xt  on 
(0) ˆ Ht  and Gt to obtain 
) 0 ( ˆ
G Λ , the loadings associated with 
Gt. We compute 
(0) (0) ˆ XX G =− Λ 
tt G t  and estimate 
(1) ˆ Ht  as the first  M r −  principal 
components of 
(0) X 
t . This procedure is repeated until convergence, and we are left 
with final estimates of Ht  and the loadings’ matrix Λ.  
                                                 
10 Ft can contain dynamic factors and lags of dynamic factors. Insofar, equation (2) is not restrictive.  
11 We have made sure that the variables in our dataset have a sufficiently high degree of commonality 
(i.e. variance share explained by common factors) and a sufficiently low degree of cross-sectional 
correlation of idiosyncratic components to yield accurate factor estimates as explained in Appendix 1. 
This also suggests that extracting the factors from the full data set rather than from sub-groups of 
specific data categories, such as house prices, stock prices, etc. is appropriate. For an example of a 
FAVAR with factors estimated from sub-groups of variables, see Belviso and Milani (2006), who 
estimate the factors and the dynamic model jointly using Bayesian methods.   
12 While Bernanke et al. (2005) include the Federal Funds rate as the only observable factor in the 
FAVAR we include in our FAVAR three observable variables as this may help to better capture the 
monetary policy reaction function. Indeed, Ahmadi and Uhlig (2008) suggest that variables which are 
highly relevant for monetary policy such as GDP and prices should be included as observables in the 
FAVAR. 
13 We have re-run the FAVAR based on 7 factors and obtained very similar impulse response 
functions. Given this finding and the relatively short sample period we prefer the more parsimonious 
specification with 6 factors. The information criteria suggested by Bai and Ng (2002) gave 
inconclusive results so that we could not rely on them.  
14 All static factors seem to be also dynamic factors. As for the determination of the number of static 
factors, we adopt also an informal approach to determine the number of dynamic factors. We find that 
6 dynamic principal components explain the same bulk of variation in the large dataset (also 64 
percent) as the 6 static factors.  
13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1178
April 2010 
Third, a VAR(2) model is fitted to ˆ G' H'' tt ªº ¬¼ .  
 
The fourth step involves identifying the monetary policy shocks and distinguishing 
between macro shocks and financial shocks without identifying macro and financial 
shocks further, e.g. splitting the macro shocks into real supply and demand shocks or 
distinguishing between share price or credit shocks, which would require imposing 
controversial restrictions. For this purpose we combine contemporaneous zero and 
short-run sign restrictions on impulse response functions.  The restrictions for the 
identification of monetary policy shocks are summarized in Table 1. They are 
implemented in two steps. In a first step we carry out a Cholesky decomposition of 
the covariance matrix of the reduced-form VAR residuals where GDP and prices are 
ordered above the Federal Funds rate and the (latent) financial factors summarized in 
ˆ Ht . This yields the restrictions that real GDP and prices are not contemporaneously 
affected by both monetary policy shocks, which is a common assumption in the 
monetary transmission studies relying on recursive identification schemes, and shocks 
to the financial factors  ˆ Ht .   
 
In a second step we rotate the Cholesky residuals associated with the M th to r th 
equations (i.e. the equations of the Federal Funds rate and  ˆ Ht ), and impose sign 
restrictions in order to disentangle the monetary policy shocks from other shocks. We 
impose a set of standard restrictions to identify the monetary policy shock, employed 
e.g. by Peersman (2005), Canova and Gambetti (2009) and Benati and Mumtaz 
(2008), and consistent with a large number of theoretical models. The Federal Funds 
rate initially increases, and real GDP and prices initially decline after the shock. 
Furthermore, we restrict monetary aggregates (real M1 and real M2) to initially fall 
after a monetary policy shock. The former restrictions help to distinguish the 
monetary policy shock further from real aggregate supply and demand shocks.
17 The 
                                                 
15 Such an identification scheme combining zero and sign restrictions is also used by JarociĔski and 
Smets (2008). In contrast to our paper, they use sign restrictions to disentangle housing supply and 
housing demand shocks, but not for the identification of the monetary policy shock. 
16 We do not apply a pure sign restrictions approach such as the ones originally proposed by Uhlig 
(2005) or by Peersman (2005). The former approach involves identifying only one column of Q in 
order to identify a single shock which is computationally inexpensive but prevents interpretability of 
the other shocks. The latter approach involves rotating all VAR residuals and allows eventually 
identifying more than one shock but is computationally intensive for large systems such as ours and 
requires theoretically founded sign restrictions for each shock. We adopt an intermediate identification 
scheme which is relatively fast and allows us to disentangle different types of shocks. 
17 After a supply shock, GDP and prices move in different directions, and after a real demand shock, all 
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latter restriction serves to ensure that the monetary policy shock is not contaminated 
by a money demand shock.
18  
 
Besides these standard restrictions we impose additional, conceptually motivated 
restrictions on two sets of variables included in Xt  in order to achieve a more precise 
identification of the monetary policy shock. First, we restrict the spreads of long-term 
(5-, 10- and 30-year) government bond yields over the Fed Funds rate to initially 
decrease after a monetary policy shock. This restriction is implied by the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis given that short-term rates increase only temporarily after a 
monetary policy shock
19 and helps to disentangle the monetary policy shock from a 
“term spread shock” which increases the yield spread and the Fed Funds rate and 
lowers output and prices. An example of a contractionary shock of that kind is the 
inflation scare of 1994, which led to a sudden increase in longer-term bond yields as a 
result of higher inflation expectations. An example of an expansionary shock is the 
“global savings glut” which has probably occurred prior to the global financial crisis. 
A number of observers have argued that it was not expansionary monetary policy 
shocks, but excessively low long-term interest rates, held down by an excess of global 
savings invested in U.S. Treasury Securities, that fuelled the pre-crisis housing and 
credit boom, and also contributed to low levels of policy rates.
20 Separating the 
monetary policy shock from this type of shock is therefore particularly relevant in the 
context of this paper. Robustness checks suggest, however, that the imposition of this 
restriction does not have a major effect on the empirical results.  
 
Second, we impose the restriction that a contractionary monetary policy shock has 
negative initial effects on stock prices (i.e. the real S&P 500, the Dow Jones and the 
                                                 
18 Like a contractionary monetary policy shock, a positive money demand shock (i.e. a shock that 
autonomously increases the demand for money balances) is associated with a reduction in real GDP 
and prices and an increase in interest rates. Thus, the two shocks can only be disentangled by imposing 
the restriction that the monetary policy shock is associated with a reduction of monetary aggregates, 
which can be rationalized by a negative effect of a contractionary monetary policy shock on money 
demand.  
19 Given that policy rates increase only temporarily after a monetary policy shock, long-term bond 
yields, which should reflect the average expected future level of policy rates, should increase by less 
than the policy rate after the shock, so that the yield spread declines. The potential reaction of term 
premia would be expected to reinforce this effect. Inflation risk premia would be expected to fall as a 
result of the disinflationary effects of the policy shock. Real term premia would also be expected to 
decline. Since short-term real rates are more volatile than long-term real rates, real term premia should 
be negative (Cochrane 2007) and, according to that logic, to decline after a monetary policy shock that 
leads to increased variability in short-term real rates. Hördahl et al. (2004) indeed show based on an 
affine term structure model that term premia fall in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock.   
20 Gerlach et al. (2008) present evidence showing that short-term nominal rates decline in response to 
negative shocks to long-term real interest rates and suggest that the decline in short-term rates after 
2000 is at least in part attributable to central banks’ reaction to the downward movement in long-term 
rates observed over this period.  
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pricing models
21 and helps to better disentangle expected and unexpected changes in 
policy rates. This is suggested by the empirical study of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 
who decomposed the Federal Funds rate in an expected and an unexpected part based 
on high frequency financial data and find that unexpected increases in the Fed Funds 
rate exert a negative effect on stock prices, while the effect of expected increases is 
found to be positive. Imposing these restrictions does alter the estimated effects of 
monetary policy shocks on stock prices and household financial wealth, which 
become insignificant if the restrictions are not imposed, but does not affect the other 
results.  
 
All restrictions are imposed on the contemporaneous response and the first lag. The 
shocks to the financial factors summarized in  ˆ Ht  (i.e. the other rotated Cholesky 
residuals) are restricted not to have the characteristics of monetary policy shocks and 
not to affect output and prices contemporaneously. We label them financial shocks in 
the following. The Cholesky residuals associated with the GDP growth and GDP 
deflator inflation equations are labelled macro shocks. More technical details on the 
identification scheme are provided in Appendix 2.  
 
This identification scheme has the advantage that it allows for simultaneous 
interaction between the monetary policy instrument and financial factors rather than 
imposing some kind of recursive ordering which is still common in many VAR- or 
FAVAR-based studies. This is important as the latent factors are linear combinations 
of many financial variables in our data set, such as stock prices and bond yields, 
which can respond instantaneously to policy shocks. At the same time, monetary 
policy is able to immediately take into account the information content of high 
frequency financial variables. Thus, in order to obtain an unbiased characterization of 
the transmission of monetary policy shocks as well as of the monetary policy stance, 
it is necessary to allow for contemporaneous interaction between the policy rate and 
the financial factors.   
 
                                                 
21 From the perspective of standard asset pricing models, such as the dividend discount model or the 
consumption-based asset pricing model, stock prices should fall in response to a contractionary 
monetary policy shock as expected dividends would be expected to fall (as a result of the negative 
output reaction) and both the risk-free component of the discount rate (as a result of higher interest 
rates) as well as the equity risk premium (as a result of the shock-induced increase in economic 
volatility and uncertainty) would be expected to rise. A formal validation of the negative effect of 
monetary policy shocks on the equity risk premium is provided by the consumption-based asset pricing 
models with habit persistence (Campbell and Cochrane 1999), which implies that asset risk premia are 
counter-cyclical and would hence be expected to increase in reaction to the counter-cyclical effects of a 
monetary policy shock.      
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functions are constructed using the bootstrap-after-bootstrap technique proposed by 
Kilian (1998). This technique allows us to remove a possible bias in the VAR 
coefficients which can arise due to the small sample size. The number of bootstrap 
replications equals 500. Notice that, since  T N > , we neglect the uncertainty involved 
with the factor estimation, as also suggested by Bernanke et al. (2005). 
 
4.  The transmission of monetary policy shocks via financial conditions 
 
4.1.  Comovement of financial variables and economic interpretation of 
the factors 
 
As the first step of our analysis, we formally assess the comovement of financial 
variables. The commonality, i.e. the variance share explained by the common factors, 
is large for all groups of variables. It is (on average over all series belonging to a 
group) at 38 percent for property price inflation measures, 51 percent for balance 
sheet components, 82 percent for credit market interest rates and spreads, and 48 
percent for changes in stock prices. The first column of Table  3 also reveals a 
relatively high commonality for the variables which were in the focus before the 
outbreak of the financial crisis and which we have shown in Figure  1, with the 
exception of the Census house price index which has a commonality of only 13 
percent.   
 
Figure 2 shows the time series of the observable and the latent financial factors (after 
removal of observable factors from the factor space). Table 2 shows for each factor 
the 15 variables that are most highly correlated (in absolute terms) with the respective 
factors together with the respective correlation coefficients. The latent factors are not 
uniquely identified, but a look at the factor loadings allows some tentative 
interpretation of the factors. The first factor (GDP growth) is most tightly linked with 
balance sheets and stock prices, the second factor (GDP deflator inflation) with house 
prices, the third factor (Federal Funds rate) with other (mainly short-term) interest 
rates. The fourth factor (and first latent factor  1 ˆ
t h ) is also highly correlated with 
interest rates (mainly mortgage loan rates and corporate bond yields), the fifth factor 
( 2 ˆ
t h ) is primarily a stock price factor, and the sixth factor ( 3 ˆ
t h ) is highly correlated 
with balance sheet components and stock prices. The finding that some of the factors 
are highly correlated with variables belonging to different groups of variables lends 
further empirical support to the notion that developments in asset prices and private 
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dynamics of these variables jointly based on a factor model approach that exploits 
their comovement.   
4.2.  Impulse response functions 
Figures 3-7 present the impulse responses of a number of selected variables to a 
monetary policy shock which raises the Federal Funds rate by 100 basis points. We 
show median impulse responses and one standard deviation confidence bands. In 
Figure 3 we show the responses of the observable variables, real GDP, the GDP 
deflator and the Federal Funds rate. An unexpected monetary tightening triggers a 
hump-shaped fall in real GDP, a delayed and persistent decline in the price level and a 
temporary increase in the Federal Funds rate. These reaction patterns are qualitatively 
in line with stylized facts established in previous studies on monetary transmission in 
the U.S. (e.g. Christiano et al. 1996, Peersman 2005).   
 
We next turn to the dynamic reactions of property prices presented in Figure 4. All 
property price measures display a strong, sluggish and persistent decline after the 
monetary policy shock, with peak effects reached between 9 and 16 quarters after the 
shock. While the reaction of the different property prices is qualitatively similar, 
discernible differences in the quantitative reactions emerge. The peak (median) 
responses of the residential price indices range between around -2  percent (NAR 
house price index) and -5 percent (Case-Shiller price index). Commercial property 
prices display the strongest response, falling by more than 8 percent at maximum after 
the shock. These findings suggest that the choice of the house price index in previous 
empirical analyses is not completely innocuous,
22 although it should be noted that the 
confidence bands are rather wide and overlapping.  
 
The explanation for the rather strong, sluggish and persistent responses of the 
property price indices are to be found in the many specific features which make 
property distinct from other assets like equity and bonds. Property markets are 
characterized by lengthy approval and construction processes on the supply side and a 
                                                 
22 Indeed, previous VAR/FAVAR-based studies on monetary transmission via house prices focus on 
different price indices. JarociĔski and Smets (2008) use the S&P/Case-Shiller index, Del Negro and 
Otrok (2007) use the FHFA/OFHEO house price indices, Iacoviello (2005) and Bjørnland and 
Jacobsen (2008) use the Freddie Mac house price index. The FAVAR-based study on the U.S. housing 
market by Ng and Mönch (2009) includes a large range of national and regional house price indices, 
but does not cover commercial property prices. The house price reaction patterns uncovered by these 
studies are very similar to ours. In contrast to this, DSGE model-based studies such as Iacoviello and 
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reason for the quantitative differences in the responses of the various house price 
measures cannot be pinned down with any great precision, as the construction of the 
indices differs in various dimensions, such as weighting schemes, geographical 
coverage and coverage of particular segments of the property and mortgage market, 
such as the sub-prime segment.
23 The finding that commercial property prices respond 
considerably more strongly to a monetary policy shock than residential property 
prices can be explained by longer construction lags, i.e. very inelastic supply, and a 
stronger responsiveness of commercial rents (Zhu 2003).   
 
In contrast to the sluggish reaction of house prices, the responses of stock prices and 
bond yields are front-loaded, consistent with the notion that financial markets quickly 
respond to news such as monetary policy shocks. Figure 5 shows the impulse 
responses of three key stock market indices, the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industrials 
Average and the NASDAQ composite in the upper panel and the response of three 
government bond yield spreads, the spreads of the 5-year, 10-year and 30-year yields 
over the Federal Funds rate in the bottom panel. The reactions of the stock market 
indices are negative and significant only immediately and in the first quarter after the 
shock when the sign restrictions are binding. Consistent with the REHTS, the 
reactions of long-term bond yields to the policy shock are found to be sub-
proportional to the reaction of the Federal Funds rate and to decrease with the 
maturity of the bond. The former pattern is not completely owed to the sign restriction 
we have imposed, as the reaction of bond yield spreads is significantly negative for 
around four quarters after the shock.    
 
Figure 6 reports impulse responses of a number of important credit risk spreads. The 
responses of the risk spreads shown in Figure 1, i.e. the 3-month commercial paper 
spread and the 3-month Eurodollar deposit spread (both over the 3-month T-bill rate), 
the 30-year mortgage rate spread (over the 30-year government bond yield), as well as 
the C&I loan rate spread (spread of C&I loan rate over the 2-year government bond 
yield)
24 are very similar. A 100 basis point monetary policy shock leads to a 
                                                 
23 Leventis (2008) concludes that one main reason for divergences in the development of the 
FHFA/OFHEO and the Case-Shiller house price indices was the inclusion of many non-agency 
financed homes with sub-prime loans in the Case-Shiller index. Against this background, our finding 
that the Case-Shiller index responds considerably more strongly than the FHFA/OFHEO index could 
be interpreted as reflecting at least in part a stronger responsiveness of house prices in the sub-prime 
segment of the mortgage market.   
24 The 2-year government bond yield is the appropriate reference rate for the C&I loan rate. The 
maturity of this rate varies but is usually close to two years. In the November 2007 release of the 
“Survey of terms of business lending” (Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release E.2.) the weighted 
average maturity of C&I loans was 612 days. 
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effect then quickly fades away, remaining significant for around 4 quarters. This 
response pattern is also present in the other money market risk spreads and the other 
mortgage market risk spreads which we do not report. The positive response of credit 
risk spreads to a monetary policy shock is supportive evidence of the existence of a 
balance sheet transmission channel
25 and/or a risk-taking transmission channel
26, 
since risks spreads should not react to monetary policy shocks if such channels were 
absent. It is, however, not possible to further disentangle the two channels.  
 
For other classes of capital market and loan market risk spreads we get a more 
dispersed picture. The Moody’s corporate bond spread (spread of BAA corporate 
yield over AAA corporate yield) is essentially unaffected by a monetary policy shock, 
which suggests that, after a monetary tightening, bond financing via lower rated bonds 
does not become more expensive than bond financing via high rated bonds. This 
finding also obtains for other corporate bond spreads (not reported). The personal loan 
rate spread (spread of 2-year personal loan rate over the 2-year government bond 
yield) is found to initially fall sharply to an extent which implies that consumer loan 
rates are essentially unaffected by monetary policy shocks. This suggests that policy 
rate pass-through to this type of loan rates is extremely sluggish.
27 The spread remains 
significantly negative for more than a year before increasing slightly. At the same 
time, the finding of unresponsiveness of consumer loan rates to policy shocks is 
                                                 
25 The balance sheet channel suggests that a monetary policy tightening has a positive effect on risk 
premia via its negative effect on the net worth and thus the creditworthiness of borrowers, who can 
only borrow at a premium over internal financing against collateral (net worth) because of 
informational frictions in credit markets. Borrower net worth, in turn, is positively linked to cash-flow 
and the value of collateralizable assets, which are in turn negatively linked to the monetary policy 
stance. In fact, as we show below, private sector net worth is found to fall significantly after a monetary 
policy shock, which is consistent with this view. The basic references for the balance sheet channel, 
which is also referred to as the financial accelerator, are Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999). 
26 The risk-taking channel suggests that monetary policy affects risk premia via lenders’ or investors’ 
willingness to take risk, e.g. via sticky return targets or an inherent counter-cyclicality of investor risk 
aversion. Sticky return targets, arising e.g. from money illusion of investors, the design of 
compensation schemes of fund managers, or pre-contracted liabilities (e.g. of insurance companies), 
would imply that risk premia are positively correlated with risk-free rates as the effect of higher (lower) 
risk-free rates on returns is sought to be compensated by less (more) risk taking (Rajan 2005). A 
positive link between policy rates and risk premia would also arise if investor risk aversion was 
inherently counter-cyclical, as in consumption-based asset pricing models with habit persistence in 
consumption (Campbell and Cochrane 1999), since monetary policy has counter-cyclical effects. For a 
more detailed discussion of the various facets of the risk-taking channel and further references, see 
Borio and Zhu (2008). 
27 For example, Hofmann and Mizen (2004) and Hofmann (2006) document the sluggish adjustment of 
retail rates to monetary policy shocks. The focus of this literature is, however, on European countries 
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a monetary policy tightening. 
Figure 7 reports impulse responses of key balance sheet positions of the household, 
the corporate non-financial business sector and the non-corporate business sector. In 
order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we report in Table 4 the nominal 
value of total assets, total liabilities and net worth of the three sectors as well as the 
shares of the various asset and liability components as of 2007. Figure 7 (a) reports 
the impulse responses of total assets, total liabilities and net worth. A contractionary 
monetary policy shock is found to be associated with a significant fall in both assets 
and liabilities, except for corporate sector liabilities which temporarily rise. Net worth 
declines significantly in all three sectors, but there are differences in the response 
patterns. The response of household net worth is front-loaded and rather small with a 
maximum response of -1 percent, reflecting, as we will see in the following section, 
the weak response of financial assets as the largest part of total assets. The reaction of 
corporate and non-corporate net worth is considerably stronger, with maximum 
reactions of -4 percent, and very sluggish and persistent. The negative response of net 
worth to a monetary policy shock in all three sectors is consistent with the potential 
existence of a financial accelerator in the transmission process. 
 
Figure 7 (b) reports impulse responses for three key components of total assets, 
namely financial assets, tangible assets as well as real estate assets, which is the 
largest component of the tangible asset category in all three sectors (see Table 4). 
There are notable differences in the reaction of financial assets, reflecting the 
heterogeneous composition of financial assets in the three sectors. Household 
financial assets respond in a very short-lived way to the policy shock, which looks 
very similar to the response we found for equity prices and interest rates. This 
similarity may be explained by the fact that the bulk of household financial assets are 
held in corporate equities and mutual fund shares and pension fund and life insurance 
reserves, which are all linked to the movements of financial asset prices and yields. In 
contrast to this, corporate financial assets temporarily increase in response to the 
shock, while non-corporate financial assets persistently decline. We are not really able 
to come up with a clear cut explanation for these differences, as the composition of 
financial assets in the two business sectors makes an interpretation rather difficult. 
The largest component of financial assets in the business sectors is the miscellaneous 
asset category, which is an assortment of financial assets that do not fit in the other 
main categories but are individually too small to be listed as a separate asset category 
(Table 4).    
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The dynamic reaction of tangible and real estate assets in the three sectors is very 
similar. A contractionary monetary policy shock triggers a sluggish and persistent fall 
in tangible and real estate assets. Given that real estate assets are valued at market 
prices, it is not surprising that their reaction pattern is very similar, both qualitatively 
and quantitatively, to that of property prices. Non-corporate and corporate real estate 
wealth reacts somewhat stronger (maximum effects of -4 percent and -6 percent) than 
household real estate assets (peak response of -3 percent), which corresponds to our 
finding that commercial property prices react more strongly to a monetary policy 
shock than residential real estate prices. 
 
Figure 7 (c) shows the reaction of the three sectors’ total debt, their mortgage debt and 
one other important debt category, which are consumer loans in the case of 
households, corporate bonds in the case of corporates and other bank and non-bank 
loans and advances in the case of non-corporates. For households, the results reveal 
that total debt and mortgage debt persistently decline by a maximum of more than 
2 percent in response to the monetary policy shock. Consumer loans, in contrast, are 
found to barely respond to the policy shock.  
 
Non-corporate debt is also found to fall persistently in response to a monetary policy 
shock, but the reaction is three times stronger (-6 percent) than that of household debt. 
The reaction patterns of mortgage debt and short-term loans are very similar to that of 
total debt. Corporate debt, in contrast, first increases significantly before it turns 
insignificant. This result is owed to the persistent and significant increase in corporate 
bond issuances (the largest component of corporate debt, Table 4) after the shock. 
Corporate mortgage debt persistently decreases even by 10  percent, which is 
substantially higher than the decrease in the other two sectors. But due to the low 
share of mortgage debt in total corporate debt, this strong reaction does not lead to a 
fall in total debt.  
 
The results of the impulse response analysis of the debt components support the 
notion that financial frictions may play a role in the transmission of monetary policy. 
The results suggest that lending by (small) non-corporate firms is more negatively 
affected by a monetary policy shock than lending by (larger) corporate firms, because 
small firms do not have access to capital market financing. The shift in financing 
patterns of the corporate sector from bank to capital market financing is found to 
occur via corporate bond issuances, which is a new result, as previous studies have 
found that corporates or large firms respond to a monetary contraction by raising 
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evidence of an increase in long-term debt (Christiano et al. 1996). As we will see in 
section 4.5, this reaction of corporate bond issuances to a monetary tightening is a 
more recent phenomenon that could therefore not be uncovered by earlier studies. 
Moreover, the reaction pattern of mortgage debt is very similar to that of property 
prices and real estate wealth, which could be interpreted as suggesting that the ability 
of the non-financial private sector to raise mortgage financing is closely linked to the 
development of real estate collateral.  
 
4.3. Variance  decompositions 
As the next step we explore the role of monetary policy shocks in the overall 
variability of the various variables over the sample period based on variance 
decompositions. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 present the forecast error variance shares 
of selected variables explained by monetary policy shocks at the 1- and 5-year 
horizons.  
 
The results suggest that the importance of monetary policy shocks for the different 
variables varies considerably. On the balance sheet side, monetary policy shocks 
explain a relatively large share (between 11 percent and 17 percent at the five-year 
horizon) of the variance of real estate assets and of mortgage debt. They also explain a 
considerable fraction of the variability of household and non-corporate total debt 
(almost 15 percent at the five-year horizon), while they appear to play no role for total 
corporate debt. These results further support the notion that financial frictions play a 
role in the transmission of monetary policy shocks, as it suggests that monetary policy 
shocks play an important role for household and non-corporate debt but not for 
corporate debt.  
 
Despite the high similarity found in the impulse responses, the variance explained by 
the monetary policy shock in the various property price indicators varies considerably.  
Monetary policy shocks account for a relatively large share of the variation in the 
FHFA/OFHEO, the Freddie Mac, the Census and the commercial property price index 
(around 10 percent at the five-year horizon), but almost nothing of the variation in the 
Case-Shiller and the NAR house price index. This implies that in case of the latter two 
house price indices the effects of monetary policy shocks are almost entirely 
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variance of corporate bond spreads and stock prices which lends further support to the 
finding that corporate sector financing conditions are barely affected by monetary 
policy shocks.  
 
4.4. Historical  decompositions 
In order to explore the quantitative contribution of the monetary policy shocks to the 
dynamics of the various variables included in Xt  over time we perform historical 
decompositions. These decompositions reflect the accumulated effect of the sequence 
of monetary policy shocks over time. Concerning the most recent period, Figure 8 
reveals a sequence of expansionary monetary policy shocks in 2001 and then again 
between 2003 and 2005. This shock pattern is reflected in the historical 
decompositions which we show for the variables that are of most interest in the 
context of this paper, namely property prices, risk spreads and debt, in Figure 9. The 
black line shows the forecast error explained by all (common and idiosyncratic) 
shocks, the red lines show the forecast error explained by monetary policy shocks.  
 
For property prices, we find that the contribution of monetary policy shocks is 
considerably larger for the FHFA/OFHEO house price index – about a third of the 
increase after 2003 is attributable to the monetary policy shock – than for the Case-
Shiller and the commercial property price index (Figure 9 (a)). The finding that the 
contribution of monetary policy shocks to the latter two price indices is rather small, 
despite the strong dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks uncovered in the 
impulse response analysis, suggests that shocks other than monetary policy played a 
more important role for their dynamics over this period.  
 
Regarding the contribution of monetary policy shocks to debt accumulation, we find a 
discernible contribution to the dynamics of household and non-corporate debt (Figure 
9 (b)). Almost half of the growth of these variables between 2003 and 2006 is 
attributable to monetary policy shocks. With regard to the corporate sector, a 
contribution of monetary policy shocks to corporate debt is visible only in 2006 and 
2007. 
 
The contribution of monetary policy shocks to the low levels of mortgage market and 
short-term money market risk spreads after 2001 is also found to be considerable, but 
level of short-term money market spreads, such as the  3-months
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 to  expansionary  monetary policy shocks. For the mortgage spread, the contribution
 is found to be around one third.   
 
Overall, the results of the historical decompositions suggest that monetary policy 
shocks contributed in a discernible way to the above average levels of property price 
inflation, debt growth and the below average level of the risk spreads, but only at a 
relatively late stage of the property and credit boom (between 2003 and 2005). This 
suggests that expansionary monetary policy shocks may have reinforced and 
prolonged the housing and credit boom but were not the trigger of the excesses, as the 
take-off in property price inflation and debt accumulation as well as the drop in risk 
premia occurred well before the contribution of the policy shocks kicked in.   
 
How do our results compare to those found by previous studies? As we mentioned in 
the introduction, previous studies have exclusively focused on the contribution of 
monetary policy to the housing boom, so our comparison is limited to that aspect of 
our analysis. There is no consensus in the literature on the contribution of monetary 
policy to the 2001-2006 housing boom. The FAVAR/VAR-based studies by Del 
Negro and Otrok (2007) and JarociĔski and Smets (2008) find little role of monetary 
policy, whereas Taylor (2007), based on a reduced form single equation estimation, 
and Iacoviello and Neri (2008), based on a DSGE model, find that the role of 
monetary policy shocks was quite important, accounting for between a quarter and a 
half of the run up in house prices between 2001 and 2006. The reasons for these 
marked discrepancies are not fully clear and have not yet been systematically 
explored. Potential explanations could be, for instance, the use of different house 
price indices or differences in the methodology. A striking pattern is, however, that 
studies based on longer samples (e.g. Iacoviello and Neri 2008, Taylor 2007) tend to 
find a larger role of monetary policy shocks than studies based on a shorter sample 
period starting in the mid- to late-1980s (e.g. Del Negro and Otrok 2007, JarociĔski 
and Smets 2008), which indicates that the choice of sample period has an influence on 
the results. Indeed, Kohn (2008) suggests, with reference to the papers by Del Negro 
and Otrok (2008) and Iacoviello and Neri (2008), that studies covering a longer 
sample tend to find larger effects of monetary policy because they include the 
Regulation Q period. The following sub-section elaborates on this issue in more 
detail. 
 commercial paper 
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monetary policy shocks in the housing boom 
In order to examine more closely whether different underlying sample periods used in 
the literature can explain different results regarding the role of monetary policy 
shocks in the 2001-2006 housing boom, we extend our dataset and replicate our 
analysis for a longer sample period starting in 1975Q1. This is the longest possible 
sample given the availability of the FHFA/OFHEO house price indices.  
The obvious advantage of choosing a long sample period is that all available 
information is exploited so that the empirical relationships can be pinned down with 
greater precision. These advantages in principle also apply in the context of this study. 
In the longer sample period we can also exploit the information from previous 
housing and debt boom episodes at the end of the 1970s and the mid-1980s which 
should enhance the precision of empirical estimates. Furthermore, by including the 
Volcker disinflation the sample contains an important natural experiment of a 
sequence of monetary policy shocks, which should be useful to pin down their 
dynamic effects with greater precision. Indeed, many studies on the transmission 
mechanism, in particular those using FAVARs (e.g. Bernanke et al. 2005, Boivin et 
al. 2009) base the analysis on long sample periods going back to the 1970s or even the 
1960s. 
 
The fundamental drawback of long samples, which also led us to choose a shorter 
sample period as the baseline, is that the analysis may be impaired by instability in the 
estimated empirical relationships owed to structural changes in the economy The 
structural changes that may have altered the monetary transmission mechanism 
comprise changes in the macroeconomic environment in the form of a more stability-
oriented monetary policy conduct leading to lower means of inflation and interest 
rates as well as, at least in part, lower macroeconomic volatility (“Great Moderation”) 
since the mid-1980s. At the same time, there have also been structural changes in the 
financial sector in the 1970s and 1980s, which may have affected the transmission of 
monetary policy via financial variables. Deregulation and innovation in the U.S. 
financial system since the late 1970s, in particular the phasing out of Regulation Q 
and the spreading of securitization, may have weakened the transmission of monetary 
policy via housing and credit markets.
28 On the other hand, other structural changes in 
                                                 
28 Phasing out of Regulation Q and spreading of securitization would be expected to have weakened the 
bank lending channel of monetary policy. Regulation Q essentially imposed a ceiling on bank’s deposit 
rates which caused an outflow of deposits when interest rates increase, thereby reinforcing the effect of 
the interest rate change (Mertens 2008). The spreading of securitization has improved banks’ ability to 
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introduction of risk-oriented capital adequacy requirements and the promotion of fair-
value accounting since the late 1980s, may have worked in the direction of increasing 
the procyclicality of the financial system and a strengthening of the monetary 
transmission via the balance sheet and the risk-taking channels.
29  
 
When running the FAVAR over the longer sample period, we keep the specification 
unchanged. Prior to looking at impulse responses and historical decompositions, we 
apply the (heteroscedasticity-robust version of the) test for parameter stability 
suggested by Nyblom (1989) and Hansen (1992) to our FAVAR. The null hypothesis 
we test is the joint stability of the (VAR coefficient and innovation variance) 
parameters of each equation. The test statistics are 0.79 for the first (output) equation, 
1.82 for the second (price) equation, 1.12 for the third (policy rate) equation and 0.58, 
0.30 and 1.42 for the three financial factor equations. The test statistics are all lower 
than the 5% critical value of 3.34 for 14 (number of regressors including the constant 
plus error variance) degrees of freedom implying that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of parameter stability. While it is well known that these stability tests have 
low power (see, for example, Cogley and Sargent 2005), these test results at least do 
not stand against performing the analysis over a longer sample.  
 
Since the S&P/Case-Shiller and the commercial property price indices are not 
available for the longer sample, we focus for comparison of the contribution of 
monetary policy shocks to the recent housing boom over the two samples on the 
FHFA/OFHEO house price index. The historical decomposition shown in the left 
chart of Figure 10 suggests that the estimated contribution of monetary policy shocks 
to the house price boom is indeed larger than for the shorter sample. In order to shed 
light on the cause of this stronger contribution we further report in Figure 10 the 
impulse response functions (middle chart) of the house price to a 100 basis points 
monetary policy shock and the (normalized) monetary policy shock series (right 
chart) for the long sample (red lines) and, for comparison again, for the short sample 
                                                                                                                                            
raise funds on the capital market by selling previously not tradable assets in repackaged form, which is 
also likely to have weakened the bank lending channel (Estrella 2002).  
29 The creation of an interstate banking system, i.e. the ability of banks to compete across state border, 
during the 1970s enhanced competition in the financial sector which should in principle have 
strengthened monetary transmission, e.g. via faster pass-through of policy rates to retail rates. The 
introduction of more risk-oriented capital requirements and fair value accounting would be expected to 
have strengthened monetary transmission via the balance sheet channel and the risk-taking channel 
(Borio and Zhu 2008). E.g. balance sheets adjust more strongly to monetary policy-induced changes in 
asset prices under fair-value accounting and banks will respond stronger to policy-induced changes in 
the macroeconomic environment under more risk sensitive capital adequacy standards. 
(black line). The charts reveal  that the larger contribution of monetary policy shocks 
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due to larger estimated monetary policy shocks, reflecting the worse fit of the 
monetary policy reaction function when estimated over the longer sample, while the 
estimated dynamic effect of a monetary policy shock on the house price is much 
smaller over the long sample although the confidence bands overlap. 
 
The longer sample analysis also enables us to assess changes in the transmission of 
monetary policy via the other financial variables included in the FAVAR. Indeed, 
time variation in monetary transmission is in general a topical issue which has been 
taken up in a number of recent studies (e.g. Boivin et al. (2009) and references therein 
as well). Since the topic is however somewhat beyond the scope of our analysis, we 
only touch upon the issue in passing. In the Appendix (Figures A.1-A.5) we report 
impulse response functions of the macro variables and a number of key financial 
variables to a (normalized) monetary policy shock for the long sample (red line) and, 
of interesting changes in the transmission of monetary policy. First, the effect of 
monetary policy shocks on output and prices appears to have become somewhat 
weaker, in line with Boivin and Giannoni (2006), but the differences do not appear to 
be significant as the confidence bands overlap. The reaction of the Fed Funds rate is 
found to be considerably more persistent over the short sample, which points to a 
higher degree of gradualism in the conduct of monetary policy over the more recent 
period. Second, monetary transmission via property and mortgage markets appears to 
have become more potent over time. Also, the monetary transmission on money 
the same
 time, the pass-through to stock prices and financial assets seems to have weakened
 over  time.  Third,  the  ability  of  the  corporate  sector  to  increase its  debt after  a 
monetary  policy  shock by issuing corporate bonds is a more recent phenomenon that 
cannot be observed over longer sample periods and could therefore not be uncovered 
by earlier studies such as Christiano et al (1996).  
 
Overall, the long sample analysis has revealed notable differences in the monetary 
transmission to a number of financial variables across sample periods. Therefore, the 
analysis of the remainder of the paper is based on our benchmark sample period 
1987Q3 to 2007Q4.   
 
for comparison, our shorter baseline sample (black line). The charts point to a number 
market and C&I loan rate spreads seems to have increased considerably. At 
28
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1178
April 20105.  The role of systematic monetary policy in the pre-crisis housing and 
credit boom 
 
Having so far analyzed the role of monetary policy shocks, i.e. the unexplained or 
unsystematic part of monetary policy, in the pre-crisis build-up of imbalances in 
housing and credit markets, we now draw our attention to the role of systematic 
monetary policy, i.e. the contribution of the reaction of policy rates to financial and 
macro shocks. Of particular interest is obviously the role of the systematic reaction of 
monetary policy to financial shocks, as this would capture the hypothesis that the 
monetary easing in reaction to the bursting stock market bubble after 2000 has 
contributed to the subsequent housing and debt boom.
30  
 
The analysis of this section proceeds in two steps. We first investigate based on a 
historical decomposition the underlying drivers of the path of policy rates over time 
and assess to what extent financial and macro shocks contributed to the exceptionally 
low levels of policy rates before the crisis. In the second step we carry out a 
counterfactual experiment in order to quantify the feedback effects of the policy rate 
reaction to these shocks on housing and credit markets.   
 
5.1. The drivers of the path of policy rates 
 
The interest rate equation in our FAVAR can be seen as an interest rate rule 
comprising besides the standard macro variables also financial factors, thereby 
accommodating the notion that central banks monitor and take into account the 
information content of a large range of asset prices and financial indicators. Since our 
shock identification scheme allows for a contemporaneous reaction of policy rates to 
financial factors, we can use our empirical framework to assess in a realistic way the 
contribution of financial shocks to the systematic conduct of monetary policy. 
Furthermore, we also assess the role of macro shocks for the path of policy rates.  
 
Figure 11 shows the historical decomposition of the Federal Funds rate reporting the 
contribution of monetary policy shocks (red line) as well as of the macro shocks (blue 
line) and of the financial shocks (green line).
31 The decomposition suggests that the 
low level of policy rates between 2001 and 2004 has been mainly attributable to 
negative macroeconomic and financial shocks, but only initially to expansionary 
monetary policy shocks. Negative macro shocks may reflect the post-2000 economic 
                                                 
30 See e.g. Lansing (2008) for some formal evidence on the role of stock market variables in an 
estimated policy reaction function for the Fed and in the path of the Fed Funds rate over time. 
31 The confidence bands for the historical decompositions, which we do not report, are rather tight. 
29
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1178
April 2010downturn, and negative financial shocks probably reflect the bursting of the dotcom 
bubble and the decline in long-term interest rates. By 2003, the contribution of the 
monetary policy shocks to the level of the Federal Funds rate had already turned 
slightly positive again. After 2003, the decomposition attributes the low level of the 
Federal Funds rate mainly to expansionary monetary policy shocks. Possible 
explanations for the sequence of expansionary monetary policy shocks after mid-2003 
are that potential output growth had been overestimated, probably under the 
impression of the preceding “New Economy” boom and the acceleration in financial 
innovation, and hence, the output gap and inflationary pressures had been 
underestimated.
32 In fact policy makers at that time even expressed concerns of a 
deflation (e.g. Bernanke 2002, Greenspan 2007). Interestingly, the decomposition 
suggests that the post-2005 increase in the Fed Funds rate was to a large extent driven 
by contractionary monetary policy shocks, but also by financial shocks. The latter 
probably reflects the recovery of stock markets after 2004, the increase in long-term 
interest rates after 2005 and the boom in housing and credit markets which peaked in 
2006. 
 
The results of the decomposition fit nicely with other anecdotal evidence on the role 
of financial factors in the conduct of U.S. monetary policy. In particular, the 
decomposition suggests that the largest part of the reduction in the Fed Funds rate that 
occurred after the recession in 1990/91 was attributable to a reaction to shocks to the 
financial factors. This finding is consistent with the view that during this period, 
which is commonly referred to as the “financial headwinds” episode, financial 
developments played an important role in the Fed’s policy considerations. This has 
also been implied by statements of Fed officials, such as the statement by former 
Chairman Greenspan (1994) that the monetary easing during this period was 
prompted by “the consequences of balance-sheet strains resulting from increased 
debt, along with significant weakness in the collateral underlying that debt. 
Households and businesses became much more reluctant to borrow and spend, and 
lenders to extend credit. In an endeavour to defuse these financial strains we moved 
short-term rates in a long series of steps through the summer of 1992, and we held 
them at unusually low levels through the end of 1993 – both absolutely and, 
importantly, relative to inflation”.   
 
                                                 
32 This interpretation is supported by the fact that output growth and inflation forecasts of the Fed at 
that time, e.g. presented in the Greenbook published in December 2003, were clearly above the (today 
available) final estimates. It is further supported by downward revisions of potential output growth 
estimates for the years 2002-2008 (and 2002-2012, respectively) by the CBO between e.g. August 2002 
and August 2009. 
30
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1178
April 201029
In order to show how the inclusion of financial factors in the model influences the 
interpretation of the drivers of the observed path of the Fed Funds rate, we replicate 
the decomposition of the Federal Funds rate based on a simple VAR(2) which only 
comprises the three observables (GDP growth, GDP deflator inflation and the Federal 
Funds rate) as endogenous variables but not the latent financial factors and compare 
the results with those obtained based on the FAVAR. We adopt the same 
identification scheme as before to identify a monetary policy shock (except that we 




Two results are worthwhile noting. First, Figure 12 suggests that the contributions of 
financial shocks to the historical path of the Federal Funds rate estimated based on the 
FAVAR (the green line in Figure 11) are now partly attributed to monetary policy 
shocks (mainly between 1992 and 2001) and partly to macro shocks (before 1992 and 
after 2001). Second, the size of the monetary policy shock (i.e. the instantaneous 
impact of a one standard deviation monetary policy shock on the Federal Funds rate) 
estimated based on the VAR exceeds the size of the monetary policy shock estimated 
based on the FAVAR by roughly ¼ (24 compared to 19 basis points). Overall, this 
suggests that monetary policy shocks estimated based on a model without financial 
factors may capture omitted financial shocks and that not including financial factors 
in empirical models of monetary policy may give rise to misleading interpretation of 
the drivers of the path of policy rates. 
 
5.2. A counterfactual experiment 
 
In order to explore the role of the systematic monetary policy reaction to financial and 
macro shocks in the pre-crisis booms in housing and credit markets, we carry out a 
counterfactual experiment in the vein of Bernanke et al. (1997) and Sims and Zha 
(1998). The experiment is based on a counterfactual path of policy rates, which would 
have prevailed in absence of financial shocks or of both financial and macro shocks. 
The quantitative contribution of systematic monetary policy is then computed by 
performing a historical decomposition based on the counterfactual sequence of 
                                                 
33 The implementation of this identification scheme in this VAR is less straightforward compared to the 
FAVAR. As before we first carry out a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the 
reduced-form VAR residuals. We then rotate the three Cholesky residuals as described in the 
Appendix. To identify monetary policy shocks we keep of all the draws those which satisfy the sign 
restrictions presented in Table 1 for GDP and the GDP deflator for horizon 1 and the Federal Funds 
rate for horizons 0-1. In addition, we allow the impact response of GDP and the GDP deflator to only 
deviate from zero by some very small fixed number. The other two rotated Cholesky residuals (which 
are orthogonal to the policy shock) can be labelled macro shocks. 
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counterfactual path.  
 
Figure 13 shows for a number of key variables the contributions of the original 
monetary policy shocks (red line), of the combined contribution of the original 
monetary policy shocks and the systematic reaction of monetary policy to financial 
shocks (green dashed line) and of the combined contribution of the original monetary 
policy shocks and the systematic reaction of monetary policy to both financial and 
macro shocks (blue dashed line). Accordingly, the contribution of the systematic 
reaction of monetary policy to financial shocks is the difference between the green 
dashed line and the red line, and the additional contribution of the policy reaction to 
macro shocks is the difference between the blue dashed line and the green dashed 
line. 
 
The charts suggest that the systematic reaction of monetary policy in particular to 
financial shocks seems to have also contributed in a considerable way to the pre-crisis 
house price and credit boom. As would be expected from the decomposition of the 
Federal Funds rate in the previous subsection, the contribution of the systematic 
policy reaction to financial shocks kicks in already in early 2002, and thus much 
earlier than the contribution of the monetary policy shocks. Quantitatively, the 
contribution of systematic monetary policy seems to be at least as important as the 
contribution of policy shocks.   
 
Overall, the results of the counterfactual analysis support the view that monetary 
policy was a key driver of the housing and credit boom. It would, however, be 
premature to draw strong policy conclusions based on these findings since 
counterfactual experiments in reduced form models are prone to the Lucas critique: 
changes of private sector expectations of the policy process that may result from the 
policy changes that are implied by the counterfactual and may alter the parameters of 
the model are not accounted for (Sims and Zha 1998). The results of the 






estimated on quarterly data over the sample period 1987 to 2007 to explore the 
interaction between monetary policy and more than 200 financial and asset variables 
This paper uses a factor augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) 
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in the U.S. We adopt an identification scheme that allows for contemporaneous 
interaction between financial factors and policy interest rates and enables a more 
accurate identification of the monetary policy shock by imposing additional 
theoretically motivated sign restrictions in the FAVAR besides the standard 
restrictions used in the literature. The paper contributes to the literature in the 
following ways. (i) We provide a unified and comprehensive characterization of the 
transmission of monetary policy shocks via financial conditions, covering a broad 
range of asset prices, interest rates, risk spreads and private sector balance sheet 
components by means of impulse response analysis; (ii) we assess, based on historical 
decompositions, the role of monetary policy shocks in the three phenomena that 
characterized the U.S. financial landscape prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
i.e. the housing and debt boom and the low risk spreads in credit markets; (iii) besides 
assessing the role of monetary policy shocks, we also explore based on counterfactual 
simulations the role of systematic monetary policy, i.e. of the estimated reaction of the 
policy rate to financial and macro shocks.  
 
The main findings of our analysis are as follows. (i) Monetary policy shocks have a 
highly significant and persistent effect on property prices, real estate wealth and 
private sector debt as well as a strong short-lived effect on risk spreads in the money 
market, the mortgage market and the C&I loan market. The impulse response analysis 
supports the notion that financial frictions probably play a role in the transmission of 
monetary policy. In particular, the finding that risk spreads increase significantly after 
the finding that borrowing by (small) non-corporate firms is more  negatively
 affected
 
by a monetary policy shock than borrowing by (larger) corporate firms, which
 in fact increases after a policy tightening because of higher corporate bond issuances,
 is in line with the view that small firms are more prone to become borrowing constrained 
because they do not have access to capital market financing.  
 
(ii) Monetary policy shocks have contributed discernibly, but at a late stage to the 
unsustainable dynamics in housing and credit markets that were observed between 
2001 and 2006. This suggests that expansionary monetary policy shocks may have 
reinforced and prolonged the housing and credit boom but were not the trigger of the 
excesses, as the take-off in property price inflation and debt accumulation as well as 
the drop in risk premia occurred well before the contribution of the policy shocks 
kicked in. 
 








(iii) Negative financial shocks in the wake of the bursting the stock market bubble 
have significantly contributed to the low level of policy rates observed prior to the 
crisis. The feedback effects of these negative financial shocks via lower policy rates 
on property and credit markets are found to have probably been considerable. The 
counterfactual analysis, together with the historical decomposition, therefore supports 
the view held by Taylor (2007) that monetary policy was a key driver of the housing 
boom. It would however be premature to draw strong policy conclusions based on 
these findings since counterfactual experiments in reduced form models are prone to 
the Lucas critique. Hence, the results of the counterfactual simulation should be taken 
with caution. 
 
Besides these main results a number of findings from a comparative longer sample 
analysis starting in the mid-1970s are worth highlighting. Monetary transmission via 
property and mortgage markets as well as several credit risk spreads appears to have 
become more potent over time. Also, the ability of the corporate sector to increase its 
debt after a monetary policy shock by issuing corporate bonds is a more recent 
phenomenon that cannot be observed over longer sample periods and could therefore 
not be uncovered by earlier studies such as Christiano et al. (1996). Finally, different 
findings in the literature with regard to the importance of monetary policy shocks for 
the pre-crisis house price boom seem to be due to differences in the choice of the 
sample period. A larger contribution is found over the longer sample period, which is 
attributable to larger estimated policy shocks.  
 
While these results have proved robust to considerable perturbations in the 
specification of the empirical model, there are, as always, a number of interesting 
potential extensions of the analysis which we saw as being beyond the scope of this 
paper. Two potential extensions appear to be particularly interesting avenues for 
future research. First, it is often suggested that the response of the U.S. Fed to 
financial market developments might be asymmetric to the extent that there is no 
tightening in the boom, but an aggressive loosening in the bust.
34 However, so far 
                                                 
34 An asymmetric policy conduct of the Fed in response to financial market gyrations under the 
Greenspan chairmanship, also referred to as the “Greenspan put”, is inferred by some observers from a 
number of statements by former chairman Greenspan. For instance, in a speech in 1999, Greenspan 
stated: “[O]bviously, if we could find a way to prevent or deflate emerging bubbles, we would be better 
off. But identifying a bubble in the process of inflating may be among the most formidable challenges 
confronting a central bank, pitting its own assessment of fundamentals against the combined judgment 
of millions of investors …. The danger is that … an unwarranted, perhaps euphoric, extension of recent 
developments can drive equity prices to levels that are unsupportable even if risks in the future become 
relatively small. Such straying above fundamentals could create problems for our economy when the 
inevitable adjustment occurs. It is the job of economic policymakers to mitigate the fallout when it 
occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion.” (Greenspan 1999).   
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by the Fed. If such asymmetry were present, the analysis we have performed might 
understate the role of the systematic policy reaction to financial shocks, as the 
reaction to the negative shocks would have been stronger while that to the positive 
shocks would have been weaker. Second, since the focus of this paper is on monetary 
policy, we do not explicitly assess the role of alternative drivers of the U.S. housing 
and credit boom such as a “global savings glut” shock, i.e. excessively low long-term 
interest rates held down by an excess of global savings invested in U.S. Treasury 
demand. Via our modelling set-up, we have, however, made sure that our analysis of 
the role of monetary policy for financial conditions is not impaired by other forces not 
explicitly explored.  
 
Securities,  expansionary  fiscal  policy  shocks, or exogenous increases in housing 
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April 2010horizon y p ffr monet. aggregates term spreads stock prices
00 0 
1 
Variable ǻyt Variable ǻpt Variable ffrt Variable Variable Variable
1 111 0.420 18 0.692 185 0.998 221 0.942 122 0.759 113 0.658
2 163 0.373 96 0.668 188 0.998 220 0.941 120 0.759 112 0.629
3 115 0.370 12 0.583 189 0.996 216 0.938 159 0.744 162 0.626
4 88 0.363 7 0.575 186 0.996 218 0.938 164 0.726 130 0.619
5 92 0.356 26 0.565 182 0.994 217 0.937 125 0.703 136 0.610
6 119 0.343 13 0.550 183 0.994 219 0.937 123 0.693 141 0.610
7 118 0.343 31 0.535 200 0.994 213 0.936 176 0.676 229 0.604
8 107 0.336 44 0.507 190 0.992 215 0.936 121 0.675 155 0.601
9 112 0.331 17 0.503 187 0.992 214 0.935 131 0.658 116 0.596
10 93 0.325 37 0.498 184 0.989 193 0.933 163 0.638 119 0.594
11 164 0.323 25 0.492 191 0.978 194 0.929 94 0.631 118 0.594
12 227 0.321 45 0.489 192 0.922 222 0.916 156 0.630 161 0.593
13 70 0.319 19 0.488 196 0.872 192 0.911 126 0.629 103 0.591
14 73 0.317 21 0.479 193 0.862 202 0.909 88 0.619 107 0.588
15 110 0.316 38 0.474 220 0.859 196 0.908 181 0.598 139 0.586
1 ˆ
t h 3 ˆ
t h 2 ˆ
t h







Note: y, p and ffr refer to GDP, the GDP deflator and the Federal Funds rate, respectively. The term 
spreads are the spreads of the 5-, the 10- and the 30-year government bond yields over the Federal 
Funds rate, monetary aggregates are M1 and M2 divided by the GDP deflator, and stock prices are the 






Table 2: Correlation coefficients between factors and most highly correlated 
variables
 
Note: This table shows which 15 variables are most highly correlated with the r (observable and 
latent) factors and the corresponding correlation coefficients. Which number refers to which variable 
can be seen from Table A1. 
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Variance shares Forecast error variance shares 
explained by explained by monetary policy shocks
common factors 1 year 5 years
Macro variables
GDP 1.00 0.01 0.06
GDP deflator 1.00 0.00 0.04
Federal funds rate 1.00 0.26 0.18
Property prices
House price (FHFA/OFHEO) 0.65 0.06 0.13
House price (S&P/Case-Shiller) 0.37 0.02 0.01
Commercial property price index 0.19 0.02 0.09
House price (Freddie Mac) 0.59 0.05 0.12
House price (Census) 0.13 0.04 0.09
House price (NAR) 0.21 0.02 0.03
Stock prices, credit and money and capital market rates and spreads
3m commercial paper spread 0.76 0.08 0.09
3m Eurodollar deposit spread 0.71 0.07 0.08
30y mortgage loan spread 0.63 0.04 0.06
Corp. bond spread 0.17 0.00 0.01
24m personal loan spread 0.71 0.09 0.09
C&I loan spread 0.71 0.07 0.08
S&P 500 0.74 0.01 0.01
Dow Jones 0.70 0.01 0.02
NASDAQ 0.33 0.00 0.01
5y yield const mat securities spread 0.72 0.04 0.06
10y yield const mat securities spread 0.77 0.05 0.08
30y yield const mat securities spread 0.79 0.07 0.08
Assets and liabilities of the non-financial private sector
Househ. assets 0.41 0.01 0.02
Househ. liabilities 0.43 0.03 0.14
Househ. net worth 0.40 0.01 0.01
Corp. assets 0.64 0.00 0.04
Corp. liabilities 0.35 0.01 0.01
Corp. net worth 0.59 0.01 0.08
Non-corp. assets 0.91 0.03 0.15
Non-corp. liabilities 0.85 0.01 0.09
Non-corp. net worth 0.67 0.04 0.14
Househ. financial assets 0.40 0.01 0.01
Househ. tangible assets 0.62 0.04 0.10
Househ. real estate assets 0.64 0.04 0.11
Corp. financial assets 0.40 0.00 0.01
Corp. tangible assets 0.66 0.01 0.09
Corp. real estate assets 0.64 0.01 0.12
Non-corp. financial assets 0.59 0.00 0.03
Non-corp. tangible assets 0.88 0.04 0.16
Non-corp. real estate assets 0.88 0.04 0.17
Househ. debt 0.52 0.04 0.14
Househ. mortgage debt 0.39 0.04 0.13
Househ. consumer loans 0.29 0.00 0.00
Corp. debt 0.64 0.01 0.03
Corp. mortgage debt 0.37 0.02 0.11
Corp. bonds 0.45 0.02 0.03
Non-corp. debt 0.88 0.02 0.13
Non-corp. mortgage debt 0.79 0.02 0.12
Non-corp. short-term loans 0.63 0.01 0.08
 
Note: The variance shares explained by the common factors refer to the stationary variables (i.e. growth rates in general),  
whereas the (median) forecast error variance shares explained by monetary policy shocks refer to the levels of the 
variables at the 1- and 5-year horizons. The total forecast error variance (to which the forecast error variance explained by 
monetary policy shocks is put in relation) was computed by summing up the forecast error variance explained by 
common (latent and observed) factors and the forecast error variance explained by idiosyncratic shocks. The latter was 
estimated by fitting an AR(1) model to each individual idiosyncratic component. The sample period is 1987Q3-2007Q4. 
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Households &  Nonfarm Nonfarm
nonprofit noncorporate non-financial 
organizations business corporate business
Assets (Bil. $) 78229 12210 28689
   of which (share)  
    Financial assets  0.65 0.29 0.48
     of which (share)
       Deposits 0.15 0.28 0.09
       Credit market instruments (securities & loans) 0.08 0.03 0.02
       Corporate equity & mutual fund shares 0.28 - 0.02
       Noncorporate equity 0.17 - -
       Pension fund & life insurance reserves 0.29 - -
       Trade receivables - 0.15 0.16
       Miscellaneous financial assets 0.03 0.54 0.71
    Tangible assets 0.35 0.71 0.52
      of which
       Real estate assets 0.83 0.93 0.61
       Consumer durables 0.16 - -
       Equipment and software - 0.06 0.27
       Inventories - 0.01 0.12
Liabilities (Bil. $) 14318 5193 12807
   of which (share)
     Credit market debt 0.96 0.69 0.53
       of which (share)
        Mortgage debt 0.78 0.71 0.14
        Consumer loans 0.19 - -
        Other loans 0.03 0.29 0.29
        Corporate bonds - - 0.52
        Corporate paper & municipal securities - - 0.05
     Trade payables - 0.08 0.15
     Tax payables - 0.02 0.01
     Miscellaneous liabilities 0.04 0.21 0.31
Net worth (Bil. $) 63911 7018 15882
Note: Real estate assets and corporate equity (also mutual fund holdings of corporate equity) are 
valued at market value, all other assets and liabilities are valued at book value. More detailed 
information on the balance sheets can be found in Federal Reserve Board (2009), Table B.100, B.102, 
B.103 (pp. 104-106). Consumer durables, Inventories and Equipment & software are valued at 
replacement costs. Source: Federal Reserve Board (2009), own calculations. 
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Real corporate non-financial business sector debt (% change y-o-y)
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3-month commercial paper spread (%age pts. over 3-month T-bill rate) 
3-month Eurodollar deposit spread (%age pts. over 3-month T-bill rate) 















1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Real Federal Funds rate (%)
Note: Real property prices and real debt have been computed by deflating with the GDP deflator. The 
real Federal Funds rate is the effective Federal Funds rate less the year-on-year change in the GDP 
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Note: Each factor is normalized to be positively correlated with the variable which is most highly 
correlated with it in absolute terms. 
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions of key macroeconomic variables to 














Note: The charts show the median and the 1 standard deviation confidence intervals. The sample period of the 
analysis is 1987Q3-2007Q4. 




Note: same as for Figure 3. 
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 Figure 5: Impulse response functions of stock prices




Note: same as for Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 6: Impulse response functions of credit risk spreads 
 
 
Note: same as for Figure 3.
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions of assets and liabilities of the non-financial 
private sector 
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Note: same as for Figure 3.
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Note: The shock was scaled to have an impact of 100 basis points on the Federal Funds rate.
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30y mortg loan spread
Figure 9: Historical decomposition of selected financial variables 
(a) Property prices 
(b) Debt
(c) Credit risk spreads 
   
Note: The black line refers to the forecast error explained by all (common and idiosyncratic) shocks, the red line to 
the forecast error explained by monetary policy shocks. The forecast error explained by idiosyncratic shocks was 
estimated by fitting an AR(1) model to each idiosyncratic component. Historical contributions are computed for 
period 0 as the shock estimate at period 0 times the contemporaneous impulse response functions, for period 1 as 
the shock estimate at period 0 times the impulse response function at horizon 1 plus the shock estimate at period 1 
times the contemporaneous impulse response function etc. Thus, the forecast horizon is 0 for the first observation, 
1 for the second, … and T-1 for the last observation. The solid lines represent the median historical contributions 
(to the stationary variables), the dotted red lines the corresponding confidence bands.  
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IRF (black: 1987-2007, red: 1975-2007)







Mon. pol. shock (black: 1987-2007, red: 1975-2007)











Figure 10: Contribution of monetary policy shocks to house price inflation 
(FHFA/OFHEO) in the long sample compared to the short sample 
Note: The long sample spans the period 1975Q1-2007Q4. The short sample is as before 1987Q3-2007Q4. The 
historical decomposition refers to house price inflation, the impulse response functions to the levels of house 
prices. In the chart for the impulse response function and the monetary policy shock, the red line refers to the long 
sample and the black line to the short sample. For further details see notes below Figures 3, 8 and 9. 
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Figure 11: Historical decomposition of the Federal Funds rate 
Note: The black line refers to the contribution of all (common and idiosyncratic) shocks, the other lines indicate 
the contribution of shocks; for more details, see note below Figure 9. 
Figure 12: Historical decomposition of the Federal Funds rate based on a VAR 
without financial factors 
 
 
Note: The black line refers to the contribution of all (common and idiosyncratic) shocks, the other lines indicate 
the contribution of shocks; for more details, see note below Figure 9. 
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Figure 13: Historical decompositions and counterfactual simulations – the role of 
monetary policy shocks and of systematic monetary policy 





 (c) Credit risks spreads 
 
 
Note: The black line refers to the contribution of all (common and idiosyncratic) shocks, the solid red lines to the 
systematic reaction of monetary policy to financial shocks (green) and the contributions of monetary policy shocks 
and the systematic reaction of monetary policy to both financial and macro shocks (blue). The contribution of the 
systematic response of monetary policy was obtained based on a counterfactual experiment. For details on the 
counterfactual experiment, see the main text. For more details on the historical decomposition, see note below 
Figure 9. 
contribution of monetary policy shocks and the dashed lines to the contribution of monetary policy shocks and the 
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April 2010Appendix 1: Verifying the validity of assumptions of the approximate 
factor model for our dataset 
 
An important assumption of the approximate dynamic factor model we employ is 
weak correlation of idiosyncratic components and a high commonality (i.e. share of 
variation explained by the common component). Boivin and Ng (2006) have shown 
based on simulations that low commonality and highly cross-correlated idiosyncratic 
components may seriously worsen the factor estimates. This problem has been 
discussed and been taken into account in various empirical forecasting studies (see 
Eickmeier and Ziegler (2008) and references therein) but rarely in more structural 
studies.  
 
In order to assess whether this may be an issue in our dataset, we estimate r  principal 
components from Xt , remove series with low commonality (e.g. here defined as a 
variance share explained by the common factors of  0.2 <  and, respectively,  0.3 < ) 
and, alternatively, highly cross-correlated idiosyncratic components from the dataset 
following Rule 1 suggested in Boivin and Ng (2006). This rule involves looking at 
each series  1,..., iN =  in Xt  and dropping the series  j from the rest of the dataset 
whose idiosyncratic component is most correlated with the idiosyncratic components 
of series i. If the idiosyncratic components of series i and  j are most correlated with 
each other, the series with the lower commonality is selected for dropping. We then 
re-estimate factors from the reduced dataset, remove, as before, the observable factors 
from the space spanned by all r  factors, and compare the remaining rM −  factors 
with the estimated latent factors  1 ˆ
t h ,  2 ˆ
t h  and  3 ˆ
t h  that were extracted from the full 
dataset.  
 
Table A.2 shows that the factors extracted from the entire dataset (which we use in 
our estimation) are almost perfectly correlated with the factors extracted from the 
reduced datasets. We therefore can conclude that low commonality and cross-
correlated idiosyncratic errors are not problems in our dataset and that the factors we 
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Suppose  t u ˆ  is the  1 r×  vector of reduced form VAR residuals where the latent and 
observable factors are the endogenous variables. The  1 r×  vector of (orthogonalized) 
Cholesky residuals  t v  is estimated as  
  ˆ ˆˆ vA u
t t = , (A1) 
where  ˆ A  is the lower triangular Cholesky matrix of  ) u ˆ cov( t . We partition  ˆ vt  in two 
parts, the  1 1 M −× vector of Cholesky residuals associated with GDP growth and 
GDP deflator inflation 
1... 1 ˆ v
M
t
−  and the  1 1 rM −+ ×  vector of Cholesky residuals 
associated with the Federal Funds rate and the latent factors 
... ˆ v
Mr
t , and 
1... 1 ... ˆˆ ˆ v=v ' v ''
MM r
tt t
− ªº ¬¼ . The estimated vector of structural shocks 
1... 1 ... ˆˆ ˆ ww ' w ' '
MM r
tt t
− ªº = ¬¼  is related to  ˆ vt  as follows. Let 
1... 1 1... 1 ˆˆ w= v
MM
tt
−−  and 
... ... ˆˆ w= R v
Mr Mr
tt where  R  is the  1 1 rM rM −+ × −+  rotation matrix and  1 R'R IrM −+ =  
and, by construction,  1 ˆ cov(w ) I tr M +− = .  
The rotation matrix R  is chosen such that the identifying restrictions specified in the 
main text are satisfied. Any  1 rM −+ -dimensional rotation matrix can be 



































) cos( ) sin(
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θ , (A2) 
where only rows l and n are rotated by the angle  i θ , and there are 
(1 ) ( (1 ) 1 ) / 2 rM rM −+ −+ −  possible bivariate rotations. Hence, 
1 ( 1)(( 1) 1)/2 ,..., rM rM θ θ θ −+ −+ − = .  
It turns out that more than one θ  satisfy the sign restrictions. Previous studies usually 
consider them all. This leads to large uncertainty bands reflecting not only sampling 
uncertainty but also identification uncertainty, as illustrated by Paustian  (2007). 
Recently, Fry and Pagan (2007) have called attention to another possible problem. 
They argue that the literature often presents summary measures of impulse response 
functions such as the medians that come from different models or, put differently, that 
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choosing, out of all θ  that satisfy the sign restrictions, the θ  that leads to impulse 
response functions which are as close as possible to their median values, and we 
follow their suggestion. We first draw each rotation angle randomly from a uniform 
distribution between 0 and π , until we have obtained K   θ s which satisfy the 
restrictions.  K  is set at 200 to keep it computationally tractable. For each θ , we 
compute impulse responses of the restricted variables to monetary policy shocks. To 
make them unit-free, we standardize them by subtracting their medians and dividing 
by their standard deviation over all models. For each θ  and some fixed horizon, we 
group the standardized impulse responses into a  1 × L  vector ϑ  (L is the number of 
restricted variables/impulse response functions). We pick the θ  that minimizes  ' ϑ ϑ , 
denoted by  * θ . Based on  * θ , we compute the rotation matrix R( *) θ .
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1 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index, U.S. FHFA/OFHEO 0
2 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index AK FHFA/OFHEO 0
3 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index AL FHFA/OFHEO 0
4 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index AR FHFA/OFHEO 0
5 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index AZ FHFA/OFHEO 0
6 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index CA FHFA/OFHEO 0
7 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index CO FHFA/OFHEO 0
8 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index CT FHFA/OFHEO 0
9 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index DC FHFA/OFHEO 0
10 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index DE FHFA/OFHEO 0
11 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index FL FHFA/OFHEO 0
12 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index GA FHFA/OFHEO 0
13 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index HI FHFA/OFHEO 0
14 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index IA FHFA/OFHEO 0
15 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index ID FHFA/OFHEO 0
16 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index IL FHFA/OFHEO 0
17 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index IN FHFA/OFHEO 0
18 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index KS FHFA/OFHEO 0
19 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index KY FHFA/OFHEO 0
20 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index LA FHFA/OFHEO 0
21 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index MA FHFA/OFHEO 0
22 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index MD FHFA/OFHEO 0
23 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index ME FHFA/OFHEO 0
24 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index MI FHFA/OFHEO 0
25 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index MN FHFA/OFHEO 0
26 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index MO FHFA/OFHEO 0
27 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index MS FHFA/OFHEO 0
28 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index MT FHFA/OFHEO 0
29 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index NC FHFA/OFHEO 0
30 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index ND FHFA/OFHEO 0
31 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index NE FHFA/OFHEO 0
32 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index NH FHFA/OFHEO 0
33 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index NJ FHFA/OFHEO 0
34 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index NM FHFA/OFHEO 0
35 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index NV FHFA/OFHEO 0
36 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index NY FHFA/OFHEO 0
37 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index OH FHFA/OFHEO 0
38 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index OK FHFA/OFHEO 0
39 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index OR FHFA/OFHEO 0
40 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index PA FHFA/OFHEO 0
41 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index RI FHFA/OFHEO 0
42 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index SC FHFA/OFHEO 0
43 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index SD FHFA/OFHEO 0
44 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index TN FHFA/OFHEO 0
45 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index TX FHFA/OFHEO 0
46 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index UT FHFA/OFHEO 0
47 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index VA FHFA/OFHEO 0
48 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index VT FHFA/OFHEO 0
49 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index WA FHFA/OFHEO 0
50 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index WI FHFA/OFHEO 0
51 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index WV FHFA/OFHEO 0
52 FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index WY FHFA/OFHEO 0
53 Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index, United States (Q1-87=100)  Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 0
54 Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage Purchase-Only Home Price Index, US (Q1-87=100)  Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 0
55 Price Index of New 1-Family Houses Sold (2005=100)  Census Bureau 0
56 NAR Median Sales Price: Existing 1-Family Homes, United States (Dollars)  National Association of Realtors 0
57 New 1-Family Houses: Median Sales Price, U.S. Total (Dollars)  Census Bureau 0
58 New 1-Family Houses: Median Sales Price, Northeast (Dollars)  Census Bureau 0
59 New 1-Family Houses: Median Sales Price, Midwest (Dollars)  Census Bureau 0
60 New 1-Family Houses: Median Sales Price, South (Dollars)  Census Bureau 0
61 New 1-Family Houses: Median Sales Price, West (Dollars)  Census Bureau 0
62 New 1-Family Houses: Average Sales Price, U.S. Total (Dollars)  Census Bureau 0
63 New 1-Family Houses: Average Sales Price, Northeast (Dollars)  Census Bureau 0
64 New 1-Family Houses: Average Sales Price, Midwest (Dollars)  Census Bureau 0
65 New 1-Family Houses: Average Sales Price, South (Dollars)  Census Bureau 0
66 New 1-Family Houses: Average Sales Price, West (Dollars)  Census Bureau 0
67 S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index: U.S. National (Q1-00=100)  Standard & Poor's 0
68 S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index: Composite 10 (Jan-00=100)  Standard & Poor's 0
69 Commercial Real Estate: Transaction-Based Price Index: All Properties (Q1-84=100)  MIT/Center for Real Estate 0
70 Households, Total Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
71 Households, Tangible Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
72 Households, Real Estate Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
73 Households, Consumer Durable Goods Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
74 Households, Financial Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
75 Households, Deposits Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
76 Households, Credit Market Instruments Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
77 Households, Corporate Equity Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
78 Households, Mutual Fund Shares Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
79 Households, Life Insurance Reserves Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
80 Households, Pension Funds Reserves Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
Table A.1: Data 
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81 Households, Total Liabilities Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
82 Households, Debt Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
83 Households, Home Mortgage Debt Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
84 Households, Consumer Credit Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
85 Households, Net Worth Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
86 M1 Federal Reserve Board 0
87 M2 Federal Reserve Board 0
88 Corporate Sector, Total Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
89 Corporate Sector, Tangible Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
90 Corporate Sector, Real Estate Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
91 Corporate Sector, Inventories Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
92 Corporate Sector, Financial Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
93 Corporate Sector, Liabilities Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
94 Corporate Sector, Debt Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
95 Corporate Sector, Commercial Paper Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
96 Corporate Sector, Mutual Fund Shares Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
97 Corporate Sector, Corporate Bonds Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
98 Corporate Sector, Bank Loans Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
99 Corporate Sector, Other Loans and Advances Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
100 Corporate Sector, Short-Term Loans Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
101 Corporate Sector, Mortgage Loans Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
102 Corporate Sector, Net Worth Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
103 Corporate Sector, Loans Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
104 Corporate Sector, Securities Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
105 Corporate Sector, Long-Term Debt Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
106 Corporate Sector, Short-Term Debt Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
107 Non-corporate Sector, Total Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
108 Non-corporate Sector, Tangible Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
109 Non-corporate Sector, Real Estate Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
110 Non-corporate Sector, Equipment and Software Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
111 Non-corporate Sector, Financial Assets Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
112 Non-corporate Sector, Liabilities Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
113 Non-corporate Sector, Debt Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
114 Non-corporate Sector, Bank Loans Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
115 Non-corporate Sector, Other Loans and Advances Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
116 Non-corporate Sector, Mortgage Loans Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
117 Non-corporate Sector, Net Worth Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
118 Non-corporate Sector, Short-Term Debt Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
119 Non-corporate Sector, Short-Term Loans Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts  0
120 S&P 500, Composite Price Index (w/GFD extension) Global Financial Data 0
121 S&P 500, Citigroup Growth Price Index Global Financial Data 0
122 S&P 500, Citigroup Value Price Index Global Financial Data 0
123 Dow Jones: 30 Industrial Stocks: Average Price Close  Global Financial Data 0
124 Nasdaq: Composite Index, (Index Feb 05 1971=100) Global Financial Data 0
125 S&P 500, Consumer Discretionary (25) Global Financial Data 0
126 S&P 500, Retailing (255) Global Financial Data 0
127 S&P 500, Movies and Entertainment (25413) Global Financial Data 0
128 S&P 500, Automobile Manufacturers (25121) Global Financial Data 0
129 S&P 500, Homebuilding (25213) Global Financial Data 0
130 S&P 500, Automobiles (2512) Global Financial Data 0
131 S&P Retail Composite Global Financial Data 0
132 S&P 500, Restaurants (25314) Global Financial Data 0
133 S&P 500, Apparel Global Financial Data 0
134 S&P 500, Hotels Global Financial Data 0
135 S&P 500, Apparel Retails (25541) Global Financial Data 0
136 S&P 500, Leisure Products (25221) Global Financial Data 0
137 S&P 500, Broadcasting and Cable TV (25412) Global Financial Data 0
138 S&P 500, Footware (25232) Global Financial Data 0
139 S&P 500, Household Appliances (25214) Global Financial Data 0
140 S&P 500, Department Stores (25531) Global Financial Data 0
141 S&P 500, Home Furnishings (25212) Global Financial Data 0
142 S&P 500, Publishing (25414) Global Financial Data 0
143 S&P 500, Textiles Global Financial Data 0
144 S&P 500, Consumer Staples (30) Global Financial Data 0
145 S&P 500, Packaged Foods & Meats (30223) Global Financial Data 0
146 S&P 500, Tobacco (3023) Global Financial Data 0
147 S&P 500, Household Products (3031) Global Financial Data 0
148 S&P 500, Food Retail (30113) Global Financial Data 0
149 S&P 500, Soft Drinks (30213) Global Financial Data 0
150 S&P 500, Personal Products (3032) Global Financial Data 0
151 S&P 500, Oil Global Financial Data 0
152 S&P 500, Integrated Oil and Gas (10121) Global Financial Data 0
153 S&P 500, Property and Casualty Insurance (40314) Global Financial Data 0
154 S&P 500, Life and Health Insurance (40312) Global Financial Data 0
155 S&P 500, Commercial Banks (4011) Global Financial Data 0
156 S&P 500, Consumer Finance (40221) Global Financial Data 0
157 S&P 500, Pharmaceuticals (3522) Global Financial Data 0
158 S&P 500, Health Care Equipment (35111) Global Financial Data 0
159 S&P 500, Industrials (20) Global Financial Data 0
160 S&P 500, Aerospace and Defense (2011) Global Financial Data 0
Table A.1: Data cont. 
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161 S&P 500, Machinery (2016) Global Financial Data 0
162 S&P 500, Building Products (2012) Global Financial Data 0
163 S&P 500, Industrial Conglomerates (2015) Global Financial Data 0
164 S&P 500, Capital Goods (201) Global Financial Data 0
165 S&P 500, Environmental Services (20215) Global Financial Data 0
166 S&P 500, Information Technology (45) Global Financial Data 0
167 S&P 500, Gold (15143) Global Financial Data 0
168 S&P 500, Chemicals Composite (1511) Global Financial Data 0
169 S&P 500, Steel (15145) Global Financial Data 0
170 S&P 500, Paper and Forest (1515) Global Financial Data 0
171 S&P 500, Diversified Metals & Mining (15142) Global Financial Data 0
172 S&P 500, Aluminum (15141) Global Financial Data 0
173 S&P 500, Diversified Chemicals (15112) Global Financial Data 0
174 S&P 500, Metal and Glass Containers (15131) Global Financial Data 0
175 S&P 500, Integrated Telecommunications (50112) Global Financial Data 0
176 S&P 500, Airlines (2032) Global Financial Data 0
177 S&P 500, Railroads (20341) Global Financial Data 0
178 S&P 500, Air Freight and Couriers (2031) Global Financial Data 0
179 S&P 500, Utilities (55) Global Financial Data 0
180 S&P 500, Electric Utilities (5511) Global Financial Data 0
181 S&P 500, Gas Utilities (5512) Global Financial Data 0
182 Interest Rates: USA 3-Month Commercial Paper  Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
183 Interest Rates: 3-Month Treasury Bills - Secondary Market, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
184 Interest Rates: 6-Month Treasury Bills - Secondary Market, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
185 Interest Rates: CDs secondary Market - 1 Month, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
186 Interest Rates: CDs secondary Market - 3 Month, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
187 Interest Rates: CDs secondary Market - 6 Month, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
188 Interest Rates: Eurodollar Deposits; London - 1 Month, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
189 Interest Rates: Eurodollar Deposits; London - 3 Month, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
190 Interest Rates: Eurodollar Deposits; London - 6 Month, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
191 Interest Rates: 1-Year Constant Maturity Securities, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
192 Interest Rates: 3-Year Constant Maturity Securities, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
193 Interest Rates: 5-Year Constant Maturity Securities, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
194 Interest Rates: 10-Year Constant Maturity Securities, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
195 Interest Rates: 30-Year Constant Maturity Securities, (% P.A.) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
196 Consumer Installment Credit; Commercial Banks: 48 Month New Car Loan, (%) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15) 1
197 Commercial Banks: 24 Month Personal Loan, (%) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
198 Finance Company: Interest Rate New Car Loan, (%) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
199 Finance Company: Interest Rate Used Car Loan, (%) Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
200 C&I loan rate Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
201 Moody's Corporate AAA Yield Global Financial Data 1
202 Moody's AA Industrial Bond Yield Global Financial Data 1
203 Moody's A Utility Bond Yield Global Financial Data 1
204 Moody's BAA Utility Bond Yield  Global Financial Data 1
205 Moody's AA Utility Bond Yield Global Financial Data 1
206 Moody's Corporate BAA Yield Global Financial Data 1
207 Moody's Corporate A Yield  Global Financial Data 1
208 Moody's Corporate AA Yield  Global Financial Data 1
209 Moody's A Industrial Bond Yield  Global Financial Data 1
210 Moody's BAA Industrial Bond Yield  Global Financial Data 1
211 Interest Rates: Moodys AAA Seasoned, (%) Global Financial Data 1
212 Interest Rates: Moodys BAA Seasoned, (%) Global Financial Data 1
213 Home Mortgage Loans: Contract Interest Rate, All Loans Closed (%)  Federal Housing Finance Board 1
214 Purchase of New Single-Family Home: Contract Interest Rate (%)  Federal Housing Finance Board 1
215 Purchase of Existing Single-Family Home: Contract Interest Rate (%)  Federal Housing Finance Board 1
216 Home Mortgage Loans: Effective Rate, All Loans Closed (%)  Federal Housing Finance Board 1
217 Purchase of Newly-Built Homes: Effective Rate, All Loans (%)  Federal Housing Finance Board 1
218 Purchase of Previously Occupied Homes: Effective Rate, All Loans (%)  Federal Housing Finance Board 1
219 Contract Rates on Commitments: Conventional 30-Year Mortgages, FHLMC (%)  Federal Housing Finance Board 1
220 Citigroup Global Markets: Credit {Corporate} Bond Yield: AAA/AA (%)  Global Financial Data 1
221 Citigroup Global Markets: Credit {Corporate} Bond Yield: A (%)  Global Financial Data 1
222 Citigroup Global Markets: Credit {Corporate} Bond Yield: BBB (%)  Global Financial Data 1
223 Moody's Seasoned Corporate Bond Spread (BAA-AAA) Own calculation 1
224 3-Month Commercial Paper Rate - 3-Month Tbill Rate Own calculation 1
225 CDs 3-Month Rate - 3-Month T-Bill Rate Own calculation 1
226 3-Month Eurodollar Deposit Rate - 3-Month T-Bill Rate Own calculation 1
227 C&I Loan Rate - 2-Year Constant Maturity Securities Own calculation 1
228 24-Month Personal Loan Rate Loan Rate - 2-Year Zero Coupon C201  Own calculation 1
229 30-Year Mortgage Rate - 30-Year Constant Maturity Securities Own calculation 1
230 Interest Rates: 5-Year Constant Maturity Securities, (% P.A.)-Federal Funds rate Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
231 Interest Rates: 10-Year Constant Maturity Securities, (% P.A.)-Federal Funds rate Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
232 Interest Rates: 30-Year Constant Maturity Securities, (% P.A.)-Federal Funds rate Federal Reserve Board: Selected Interest Rates (H.15)  1
Table A.1: Data cont. 
aggregates and balance sheet variables are divided by the GDP deflator and enter the final dataset in real terms. 
See the main text for more details on the dataset. 
Note: Data are transformed as follows. 0: log differences, 1: levels. Property prices, stock prices, monetary 
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Note: ex commonality < x indicates that series with a variance share explained by the common factors 
of < x are dropped from the dataset; with rule 1 (Boivin-Ng) variables with highly cross-correlated 
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Note: same as for Figure 3.
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Figure A.3: Impulse response functions of stock prices and government bond 




Note: same as for Figure 3.





Note: same as for Figure 3.
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Figure A.5: Impulse response functions of assets and liabilities of the non-
financial private sector (black: 1987-2007, red: 1975-2007) 
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Note: same as for Figure 3. 
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